Geopolitics at the Loading Dock
By Marcus Schick I 14 minute read
08/06/2026
In an era of geopolitical fragmentation, logistics is no longer just about the efficient transportation of goods — it is increasingly becoming a matter of resilience, sovereignty, and trust. These were the topics discussed on the sidelines of a high-profile event at the DACHSER branch in Tampere, Finland, by former U.S. Ambassador to Finland Charles C. Adams Jr., Dr. Junhua Zhang, political scientist at the European Institute for Asian Studies in Brussels, and DACHSER COO Road Logistics Alexander Tonn.
“Stability in Uncertain Times – Navigating the New World Order” — that is the theme of our discussion today. And indeed, Europe finds itself caught in an increasingly narrow space between the world’s two dominant powers: China, its key economic partner, and the United States, its long-standing political anchor. Supply chains in particular have long since become part of this geopolitical equation. How do you assess Europe’s current position in this context?
Dr. Junhua Zhang: We are living in a period of profound instability. The old order is eroding, yet a new one has not fully emerged. At the center of this transformation lies the strategic rivalry between China and the United States. China has become strong enough to challenge Washington, while the U.S. still retains significant financial, technological, and military advantages. As a result, the relationship is characterized by constant tension.
This is particularly visible in trade policy. The tariff conflict has increased the pressure on both sides, but it has also exposed mutual dependencies. The United States, for example, continues to rely on Chinese processing of rare earths, while China cannot simply replace the American market. At the same time, trade flows are being redirected: goods that once moved directly from China to the U.S. are now increasingly routed through countries such as Mexico, Vietnam, or Malaysia.
These developments are highly significant for the logistics industry. At the same time, they place Europe in a difficult position: it is not the main actor in this confrontation, yet it strongly feels the consequences from both directions.
Charles C. Adams Jr.: We are witnessing abrupt shifts: trade disputes, military escalation, and a level of uncertainty that is significantly disrupting international trade, including supply chains and transport logistics. The trade conflict is not limited to China. Take Switzerland, for example: despite its close economic ties with the United States, Washington suddenly announced high tariffs, which many observers viewed as arbitrary and disproportionate to the actual trade situation. To me, this illustrates a broader point: tariffs force companies to rethink sourcing, routing, and transportation at very short notice. Established supply chains begin to falter. And ultimately, consumers are the ones who have to pay the price.
Alexander Tonn: What is clear is that protectionism and regulatory frameworks have a strong and immediate impact on the global flow of goods. We can already see that when tariffs are imposed on trade between China and the United States, goods from China are no longer shipped to the U.S., but redirected to Europe and other markets instead. This directly affects our customers’ business and the way we operate our logistics network.
Under such conditions, it becomes extremely difficult to predict what will happen in the short, medium, and long term. As a logistics provider, you therefore need an organization that is capable at all times of meeting customer requirements. This also applies to broader political and production-related trends such as nearshoring, reshoring, friendshoring, and supply chain diversification. We constantly need to anticipate what these developments mean for our customers and for us as a logistics service provider — and how we must adapt strategically and operationally.
Charles C. Adams Jr.: At the same time, companies are confronted with rapidly rising costs, such as insurance premiums, which in some cases have increased tenfold in recent years. As a service provider, you inevitably have to ask yourself how much of these additional costs you are prepared to absorb yourself — and how much can realistically be passed on to customers.
Alexander Tonn: There are clear limits to that. The same applies to fuel costs. Since there is only so much, we can absorb ourselves, we have established corresponding models with our customers and pass on these external cost increases directly through floaters.
For smaller companies that are fundamentally sound but lack strong financial reserves, this can quickly become a highly challenging — perhaps even existential — situation. That is very clear. But beyond these safeguarding mechanisms and handling all the formalities surrounding short-notice tariffs, we also need to react immediately whenever new regulations are introduced. This creates a high degree of complexity in the operational management of a network comprising around 300 branches across 24 European countries.
Managing complex supply chains within extensive networks is one thing. Beyond that, what role do logistics infrastructure and supply chain management play in geopolitical competition?
Dr. Junhua Zhang: Globally interconnected supply chains are of enormous importance in this context. China recognized this very early on. Take the Belt and Road Initiative, for example. The original idea was that China would export its surplus production of cement, steel, and other industrial base materials particularly to economically weaker countries, thereby helping them build roads, railways, and digital networks. In return, China would gain access to the minerals and raw materials it needs to build railways, power plants, and infrastructure itself.
Against the backdrop of the visible conflict between the major powers — not only between the United States and China but also involving Russia and China — we are now witnessing an interesting shift in mindset. Recipient countries in Africa and Asia increasingly want to become more independent. This desire to create greater room for maneuvering has enormous implications for logistics as well.
One example is the rail connection between China and Europe, which during the pandemic proved to be a highly effective alternative to partially blocked maritime transport routes. However, this rail link runs through Russia. China has therefore decided to develop an additional railway corridor bypassing Russia, running through Central Asia and countries such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on its way to Europe.
This shows that competition between the major powers is not taking place solely between the United States and China. Even though bilateral government talks have recently resumed, China sees the door to the U.S. market as almost closed. As a result, the country increasingly sees an opportunity to sell its high-tech products instead in Europe and across the Asia-Pacific region, where strong purchasing power still exists.
At first glance, this may appear beneficial for consumers due to heavily state-subsidized prices — but not for industries based in Europe. Ultimately, this highly complex environment will continue to make supply chains extremely volatile.
Tariffs force companies to rethink sourcing, routing, and transportation at very short notice. Established supply chains begin to falter. And ultimately, consumers are the ones who have to pay the price.
Mr. Adams, many governments are now actively trying to reshape the interdependence between China and Europe, for example through free trade agreements with South America, India, and Australia. Will this really reduce the growing dependence on China?
Charles C. Adams Jr.: The best outcome would be for Europe to recognize the need to become more than just an integrated market. Europe should demonstrate the willingness to become a power in its own right — economically, culturally, politically, and militarily. A common market made up of 27 nations that are unable to agree among themselves is an easy target for any external economic actor — whether China, the United States, or anyone else. That is why the time has come for Europe to pull itself together. And this is precisely what is beginning to happen.
Even though current conditions are challenging, I believe that in the long term there will be a productive and cooperative relationship between China and the United States. The same applies to the BRICS countries, which have realized that once they unite and operate on the same economic and financial wavelength, they too become a force to be reckoned with.
The shift in the world order is happening — one way or another. And all of this can be healthy, provided that supply chains and international transport logistics are optimized at the same time — exactly as Dr. Junhua Zhang just described with the new rail connection between China and Europe that bypasses Russia.
Alexander Tonn: Global flows of goods will always adapt to changes in markets and continuously seek new routes accordingly. While consumer goods manufactured in China are currently being sold increasingly to European customers, the situation looks somewhat different for industrial goods. Here, we are seeing companies increasingly orient themselves towards North Africa.
Many jobs are being created in the free trade zones of Morocco and Tunisia, qualifications are being developed, and large-scale infrastructure projects are being established. In Morocco, for example, Tanger Med has become one of the world’s 20 largest ports and already offers greater handling capacity than Hamburg.
DACHSER has integrated Tunisia, Morocco, and also Turkey as neighboring regions into its European network, transporting goods from there into Europe — and from Europe onward to the rest of the world. This is an example of how, for DACHSER as a global player, everything revolves around providing logistics solutions that help our customers secure access to markets around the globe.
The global economy currently dances to the tune of the Asia Pacific economic region. From its base in Australia and New Zealand, DACHSER ASL Oceania connects people, markets, and continents.
To what extent can companies misjudge geopolitical risks?
Dr. Junhua Zhang: In the past, companies often tended to view events in their market environments as isolated “black swans.” In reality, however, these events took place within an evolving geopolitical context whose risks they did not fully understand. If you look at a single event in isolation, it becomes very difficult to anticipate the potential domino effects it may trigger across supply chains.
At the same time, the issue of security has become increasingly important — even more so for governments than for companies, which are deeply embedded in globalization and have grown accustomed to constantly emerging local and regional dynamics of change. In the end, however, it is primarily about trust. Once trust is disrupted, a security problem emerges.
In addition, there is the cultural challenge: truly understanding how the other side thinks. For Europeans, for example, a negotiation is considered successful when it creates a win-win situation. In the Chinese understanding, however, a win-win situation can sometimes mean that the other side wins twice. Of course, this is perceived as anything but fair.
Global companies therefore need cultural competence in order to understand what their partner on the other side of the world is actually feeling — and what message they are taking away from the negotiations.
Global companies need cultural competence in order to understand what their partner on the other side of the world is actually feeling.
In the past, institutions such as the United Nations, the World Health Organization, or the World Trade Organization created precisely this level of trust. What role will these supranational institutions play in the future?
Charles C. Adams Jr.: Unfortunately, I am skeptical about the medium- and long-term future of these institutions.
Take the World Trade Organization, for example: for years, the organization has been weakened by its inability to effectively enforce its own rules. One reason for this is that certain member states, including the United States, have blocked the reinstatement of its appellate body.
For this reason, I believe that much of the current turbulence is political rather than structural in nature. At the same time, this means that there first needs to be a global consensus that reliable trade relations can only be built through predictable, rules-based cooperation. At the moment, I do not see that basic consensus in place.
How, under such conditions, can volatility in supply chain design be transformed into predictability?
Alexander Tonn: A logistics company will always have to deal with volatility. That is simply the nature of business. Consumption itself is not stable. There are many “natural” events that create volatility — Easter, Christmas, or the Chinese New Year, for example. These occasions have always been associated with significant fluctuations and peaks in demand, which are then reflected throughout supply chains.
We are able to manage this, but beyond that, we also need to establish our own mechanisms for stabilizing our logistics network while at the same time responding to the specific requirements of customers and consumers. The logistics industry has been doing this quite successfully for many decades. That is why I am not concerned that Europe will face severe supply shortages under the current circumstances.
That is why I am not concerned that Europe will face severe supply shortages under the current circumstances.
Which decision that companies fail to make today will they regret in five years?
Alexander Tonn: At the moment, many companies are postponing investments in infrastructure, technology, and IT. In my view, that is the biggest mistake they can make.
Dr. Junhua Zhang: It is important to broaden the perspective from everyday volatility to structural volatility. Structural volatility sometimes appears in hidden forms. This makes it all the more important for companies such as DACHSER to conduct regular risk assessments. Which issues — such as a potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz or the ongoing Taiwan question — could carry the potential for conflict?
Charles C. Adams Jr.: I fully agree with the conclusions drawn by Mr. Tonn and Professor Zhang. As far as DACHSER is concerned, I was personally very impressed that the company invested nearly €400 million in both 2024 and 2025 — in acquisitions, in expansion, and all this during a period marked by widespread fear, uncertainty, hesitation, and retreat.
To me, that says a great deal about DACHSER as a company. Especially under the current difficult geopolitical and economic conditions, we should continue thinking about what kind of world we want to live in and what kind of world we believe it should become — one in which humanity as a whole can become more productive, more successful, and more equal.
